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Seminar paper I 
CONTEMPORARY USE OF 'ALLEGORY' AND A DISCUSSION OF 
FRANCESCO CLEMENTE'S: THE FOURTEEN STATIONS. 
Allegory has been resurrected in postmodern theory 
and art practice from, according to Craig Owens, two 
centuries of critical neglect. In this essay I give 
a short history of allegory and its changing forms, 
with an examination of Clemente's "Fourteen Stations 
of the Cross", as examples of contemporary allegory. 
I also describe the contemporary theoretical position 
of allegory which has come about largely from a re- 
reading of the writings of Walter Benjamin. Here I refer 
to Owens' two essays, "The Allegorical Impulse: Toward 
a Theory of Postmodernism", on the allegorizing nature 
of postmodern art practice. 
MacQueen states that the origins of allegory are 
philosophic and theological rather than literary. The 
structure of the fiction is dominated or preceded by 
the ideological structure, overtly moralistic, didactic, 
abstract, speculative and discursive, often expounding 
cosmic or political systems that are heirarchical and 
conservative. Allegory is closely associated with narrative, 
beginning as a myth, a narrative or narratives, which 
most intimately affect the believer- such as times, 
seasons, cities, nations, religious and secular laws, 
the sense of potential and the sense of inadequacy and 
1 failure. 
Often mysteries, it's not unusual for an allegory 
to open with a dream. A language for visionary strange-
ness and intensity, its moral and intellectual pre-
occupations tend to strengthen rather than diminish 
this visionary power. 
Allegory as a story often deals with time, as a 
journey and in its use of conventional and borrowed 
images to place itself in a time, it often links itself 
politically to a time. Allegory has always been "a 
relative, not an Absolute conception, which has nothing 
2 to do with the actual truth of the matter". Its charac- 
ters which always represent ideas, "are created ad hoc. 
to suit a particular occasion"? The "Faerie Queen" of 
1589 was in one sense the aging Queen Elizabeth 1, a 
flattery which earned Spenser a fifty pound pension. 
It is time and allegory's inseparableness, of allegory's 
manner of attaching itself to a particular time which 
has ensured it a continuing usefulness. 
The allegorist invents objects to suggest the essentials 
of the concept, also using established traditional 
symbols. These conventional symbols have gradually 
changed to more commonplace images in modern works, 
but also used in a symbolic way. Though allegories have 
an immense diversity of objectives, from political to 
religious, all are concerned with a character's manner 
of achievement as much as with the goal. It is this 
process, or progress, which symbols on their own cannot 
express. It is important to note that this progress 
form does not really advance for example, a hero may 
4 complete one task, to be rewarded with another. (In 
Clemente's paintings this process is manifested in signs 
'becoming' other signs) 
Fletcher states that the characters in allegories 
are daemonic agents- a possessed creature, between human 
and divine. This daemonic agency is usually created 
as a way of expressing a wish for great power- whether 
for good or evil- despite the fundamental irrationality 
of this pursuit. Irrational because the daemonic agent 
is in the hands of fate.The heroes of PiCaresque Romances, 
for example, "do not deliberate, but act on compulsion, 
continually demonstrating a lack of inner control"? 
Spenser's "Faerie Queen" is generally considered 
to be the last of the optimistic allegories of cert- 
ainty of man's position in the world. "In the sixteenth 
century interpretation went from the world, (things 
and text at the same time), to the divine Word deciphered 
in the world" e: One reason for the growing difficulty 
of access to fictional paradigms, for instance religious, 
or that the pattern of human life was linked to the 
seasons, is simply that it is much harder now than it 
was even quite recently to imagine a relation between 
a time of life and a time of the world. The enormous 
lengthening of the scale of history brought about through 
astronomy and geology, whilst temporarily liberating 
the sciences, presented the arts with difficulty. As 
early as 1790 James Hutton wrote-"No vestige of a beg-
inning- no prospect of an end" 7. 
With the diminishing and defusion of the base of 
cultural authority upon which allegory traditionally 
depended and a lack of consensus of philosophical and 
metaphysical belief, allegory is necessarily more ambig-
uous and elusive. The artist himself/herself, since 
the Reformation is a relatively more autonomous indiv-
8 idual. The psychological cultural reaction to an almost 
instantly systematized and scientific world was a romantic 
separatism, suspicious of the artificiality of the system 
making of allegory. A distaste for its borrowed images, 
a disbelief in the possibility of a metaphysical schem-
ata which might have absolute value, account for the 
decline in popularity of allegory. Romantic aesthetics 
were revolted by the 'art aping science'? This huge 
shift in popular consciousness also permanently altered 
the appearance of allegory, though ultimately not its 
commentary function. What would once have been called 
allegories came to be called, like Kafka's stories, 
fables or parables. Fletcher wrote that to some extent 
allegory was replaced by Freudian and post-Freudian 
psychology in its collectively acceptable explanations, 
clearly systematized and susceptible to being rendered 
10 in popularized forms. 
Allegories become scarcer or more covert after the 
end of the seventeenth century and when they appear 
they are increasingly critical towards the conventions 
and structures of society. Spenser's court of the'raerie 
Queen n is a protective if distant place. By contrast 
the court of law in "The Trial", is a vague but per-
petually immanent menace for Joseph K. The allegorical 
action in modern works is more obscure in the sense 
that it is almost impossible to ascertain its ultimate 
meaning. At the same time allusions to a common history, 
theology or mythology become less frequent as allegories 
lose their confident encyclopaedism and are more exclus-
ively personal odysseys. "1984", "Der Steppenwolf" or 
"The Trial" all assert personal choice and evaluation 
against collective and cosmic systems. 
Out of the obscurity of modern allegory grows the 
sense that the reader at times, is made to accept the 
secondary implications of the works through bafflement 
and fear rather than the desire for wisdom, that allegory 
has become less a mode of benign didacticism and more 
1 . a vehicle of uneasy coercion 1. In the writings of Joyce, 
Kafka, Faulkner, and Mann, this is partly explained 
in that they all seem to be reworking religious material 
without professing to believe the institutionalized•
morality that usually inheres in such materials. They 
can do this because they apparently have assimilated 
a vast insight into man's condition from current psycho-
logical and anthropological theories, which reinforce•
their version of reality. 
Walter Benjamin's writing on the German Trauerspiel, 
a seventeenth century dramatic form akin to the English 
revenge tradition, in "The Origins of German Tragic 
Drama" where he discovered a reflected image of the 
melancholy, homeless condition which affects the present 
day interpreter, signaled an allegorical approach to 
interpretation. The idea of homelessness also represent-
ed the state of the human being in the modern world, 
in that by language we are cut off from our source, 
our •origins. The modern person is a creature defined 
by language. We must now "inflect" ourselves into being 
1 "allegorically, as a linguistic substitute for presence" 2. 
We cannot rejoin the natural world. 
The natural world is definable without metaphor, 
unlike words which originate like something else" 13. 
Within the natural object, existence and essence co-
incide, whose temporal existence is in a way atemporal, 
without a history. 
Human consciousness, language, because it is lacking in 
timeless identity not only 'has' a history but in some sense 
'is' history. Human being is a hole in being, trying to fill 
itself, an impossible act of becoming which would obliterate 
the 'humaness of its being. 14 
De Man advocates an imagination that does not yearn 
for union with the natural object. Romantic aesthetics 
contrasted symbol and allegory as organic and motivated, 
to mechanical and arbitary. Paul-de Man's essay !Th e  
Rhetoric of Temporality", in describing the symbol as 
mystification, and associating allegory with an " authentic" 
understanding of language and temporality, initiated 
a reversal inspired by Benjamin, which made allegory 
a primary mode Of signification and left symbol as a 
special problematical case.15  The Romantic's transcen-
dental urges to bypass the claims for unredeemed time, 
to build a poetic word or symbol, striving to banish 
all metaphor and all similitude, to be in-itself, 
de Man argues, is a self delusive effort to impose union 
upon original division. The symbol, which for de Man 
can only be underwritten by God's presence, in striving 
to form a natural bond between sign and object, signals 
that its authentic condition is as arbitary sign, and 
affirms the distance between the sign and the object. 
Language cannot speak with authority about anything- about 
reality, except about the language itself. It is the nature 
of the sign to defer presence endlessly. 16 
There is a close affiliation between the referential-
ity of allegory and the 'fallen' or alienated character 
of secular language and repesentation. A great allegory 
like the poem "Paradise Lost" is a work, as Said puts 
it, about five removes from the reader. While the first 
three removes are internal to the story of the poem, 
a story of loss, the fourth remove is internal to the 
poem itself, its own sense of the inadequacy of the 
very language which enables its existence, to talk of 
its story. The last remove concerns the reader, reading 
a seventeenth century work, possible, to twentieth cent-
ury people only as an act of mediation'1 7 
In the simplest terms allegory says one thing and 
means another, both ironical and ambivalent. Conceived 
in this way, allegory becomes the model of all postmodern 
critique. "A narrative", writes de Man, "endlessly tells 
the story of its own denominational aberration"1 8 Such 
deconstructive narratives seem to reach a truth, albeit 
by the negative road of exposing an error. The result 
is an unreadability that emerges in a number of different 
ways; thematically for characters, and allegorically 
for readers and "authors", and further, "the greater 
the text, the more it can be used to undo the unavoid-
able aberrations of prior readings" 1 9 Just as de Man's 
example of Rousseau's "Julie", cannot avoid repeating 
the topographical moves she has denounced, so the critic 
skilled in detecting the blindness of prior readings, will 
produce similar errors in turn and de Man includes himself 
20 in this. 
Employing de Man's allegories of misreading, Craig Owens 
allegorizes the art produced by postmodern methods of 
assemblage. In "The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory 
of Postmodernism", Owens has 'imputed' an allegorical 
motive to postmodern art practice.21  
In the past allegory could not be imputed to an artwork. 
"Genuine allegory is a structural element", as Northrop 
Frye said, "it has to be there and cannot be added by 
critical interpretation alone"? 2 Allegory by its very 
nature has been intrinsic to the form, not only the 
internal structure of the artform, but part of the 
process of the form, in its tendency to describe its 
own commentary. 
In allegorical structure one text is read through 
another. Owens defines allegorical imagery as "approp-
riated imagery; the allegorist does not invent images 
1,23 but confiscates them . Allegory does not restore original 
meaning but supplants an antecedent one; it is a supple-
ment. On this basis Owens defines appropriation practices 
of postmodern artists as allegorical. The artists, Sherrie 
Levine, Barbara Kruger, and in Australia Imants Tillers, 
are appropriators of pre-existing imagery. He also 
examples the site specific work of Robert Smithson, 
because of its link,as it decays, to the allegorical 
cult of the ruin,- photomontage work is allegorical 
as an accumulation of fragments, and iihotographs them-
selves, he calls allegorical in their desire to save, 
to fix the transitory. Within Owens'. categorization 
of the allegorical also falls all work that cuts across 
stylistic boundaries, including art that mixes word and 
images, in that allegory "proposes a reciprocity between 
the visual and the verbal' ,24. One example is David Salle's 
" anonymously rendered sandwich of art styles", and without 
making any more examples, there are numerous artists 
whose practice falls within these categories, working 
25 within the postmodern frame. 
While Owens imputes an allegorical meaning to post-
modern art practice, he himself points out that allegory 
cannot be imputed. The reason he now does is because 
various art practices are, to his mind, decidedly 
allegorical, but modernism's legacy of distaste for 
allegory has meant recognition of allegorical practices 
has been suppressed "for it challenges the security 
of the foundations upon which [modernist] aesthetics 
is erected"? 6 Owens notes Heidegger's ironical imput-
ations of an allegorical dimension to every work of 
art, (in "The Origin of the Work of Art"), and so general-
izing the term to such an extent that it becomes meaningless. 
Yet Owens seems to be saying that very thing, as he 
seamlessly slips from describing artwork produced using 
the attributes of allegory, to de Man's allegories of 
reading/misreading: de Man allowing him to say that 
allegory "is revealed as a structural possibility inherent 
in every work" (of art), although in modernism it exists 
'in potentia , actualized only in the act of reading? 7 
Owens seems to be confirming that a total inclusion 
of all artwork, in some sense, within the allegorical 
frame which does, as he says, make the term meaningless-
means that allegory existed only up to when postmodern 
appropriative practice began; until Robert Rauschenberg t s 
painting "Allegory", of 1959-60. This picture is an 
assemblage of cast-off objects, an allegory of allegory 
as a dumping ground of culture (the museum) which needs 
to complete its allegory, to be read in the museum. 
The remainder of this paper is devoted to a contemp-
orary allegorist who needs no imputation and who, with 
his obscure, complicated pictures, breathes real life 
into an old form. "The Fourteen Stations", of Francesco 
Clemente: a series of twelve paintings shown at the 
Whitechapel Art Gallery in London, 1983. Exhibited also 
to make up the fourteen were the painting "Fortune" 
and Perseverance" and a further smaller painting, "Self-
Portrait (Crucifixion)". 
Clemente wished these paintings, all completed in 
New York in the winter/spring of 1981-82, to be first 
seen in Europe. Clemente was born in Naples in 1952. 
He speaks of his childhood as pagan as much as Roman 
Catholic, implying that the ancient gods of his child-
hood continue to inhabit the corridors of his imagin-
ation. He paints in Rome, Madras and New York, living 
for parts of the year in each city. Madras attracts 
him by its wholeness as much as by its total otherness 
to his native experience. Clemente deliberately fractures 
his painting 	inherent attachment to place, exhibiting 
New York paintings in London because he likes seeing 
work out of its milieu, surviving naked in a place it 
was neither conceived nor made. 
Evoking Benjamin's melancholy of the 'allegorical 
temperament' Clemente says "I have known since the times 
of Orpheus that I can't look back to what I loved. My 
mood is melancholic, not pathetic u28, casting himself 
as a nomadic artist in a continuing series of self-
portraits, not only always changing his geographical 
perspective but at the same time constantly moving be-
tween disparate cultural poles. He then re-casts his 
own picture into his allegories where his apocalyptic 
death of the first painterly remove, is allegorized 
into fiction, as a further loss—By apocalyptic I mean 
in the sense that apocalypse has always been taken as 
a prefiguration of the death of the individual, and 
the portraits, in establishing a chronology of the 
artist's life, proclaims death. Fifteen dark wintry 
paintings, oil on canvas, made by an Italian painter 
working in New York, among other things an ex-Dutch 
colony, in a technique invented by the Flemish and 
appropriated by Italian artists such as Antonello da 
Messina during the Renaissance. Clemente always approp-
riates the techniques of the cultural history of the 
places he has lived, along with various site-specific 
imagery. 
The Fourteen Stations of the Cross is a name given 
in post-Reformation days, to a series of sculptures 
or pictures set up in many churches in the West. They 
show various events in the passion of Christ, for the 
devotion of worshippers who cannot go to the sacred 
places of the Holy Land and who go around these s tations 
• praying at each. The Stations do not all represent events 
explicity mentioned in the gospels. The term Stations 
seems to be derived from a previously arranged public 
service held in a church, preceded by a procession to 
the meeting place. When Clemente first visited New York, 
prior to his deciding to work there, he felt it "absol-
utely essential" to approach the city from the West, 
departing from India, stopping in Japan and San Fran-
cisco. 
Here is an account of a dream Clemente says he rem-
embers from his first night's sleep in his empty studio 
in lower Broadway. He dreamt he was wandering the street 
naked, as excrement rained down from the heavens. He 
was aware of how frail: was the single human body in 
the world. In his hands he holds a small and delicate 
Pantheon, protecting it from the world, (Perseverance). 
"Thus were born, these New York paintings 'The Fourteen 
Stations "? 9 Clemente is both Baudelaire's 'flaneur', 
the compulsive street walker of the cities and the 
typical classical and Christian hero, fictionalized 
as a culture bearer. 
Clemente's tools to allegory are symbols. Popular 
cultural mythology has not disappeared even in the most 
highly automated and technologically advanced societies, 
to a large extent it is even media propagated. In 
Francesco Clemente. 1981/82 
VIII, Oil and encaustic on canvas, 198cm by 236cm 
his use of symbology these pictures recognize the 
continuing power of the elemental, with the common-place 
images incorporated into the structure of the paintings 
as repository of memory, and in this way making reference 
to moral ideas. Clemente's memory holds the countless 
unsystematized images of books, television, movies and 
museums- tokens of the inescapable, overvisualized mass 
culture. 
The human figure is Clemente's primary, almost constant 
symbol, for himself and itself and as an invocation 
of all that is outside it; which is, 
in one of its aspects a gigantic or macrocosmic body. The 
stars, the sun and the moon present an analogy to a human 
brain especially when they are taken to be the intelligence 
of a creating god. At the bottom of this macrocosmic world 
we find the organs of generation and excretion. 30 
Clemente's human is a creature of skin and organs, naked 
and aware of its nakedness. Any use of garments or clothing 
all serve to further emphasize nakedness, as in painting 
1V, the disrobing of Christ before he is nailed to the 
Cross, a symbol of castration fear, where Christ/the 
soldier/Clemente, holds aloft an empty white shirt (a 
white hole in the centre of the canvas)- or in the odd 
assortment of cast-off modern footwear littering Clemente's 
soft pink body, of painting V111 (pictured) the fetishes 
of a journey of detritus. 
The body itself is disfigured, dismembered even as 
it dismembers. In painting V, the figure, beheaded by 
the top edge of the canvas, cuts in half a small pink 
cat with a scythe like phallus or maybe the other way 
round, the feet semi-obscured by an all encircling lake 
Francesco Clemente. 1981/82 
IX, Encaustic on canvas, 198cm by 236cm 
of paint. The body is defiled when the prone yellow 
goddess in painting IX (pictured), is threatened with 
the buggery of a green (vernal) candle. This relates 
to a pornagraphic genre, known in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries as the 'remedy' theme where a 
physician administers an enema to a young woman to cure 
her of love sickness. 
In the first painting of 'The Stations', the black 
devils/Clemente, and the pale witches are symbols of 
fall. The picture invokes Goya's 'El Auellar& with the 
wreath of leaves over the head of the single devil in 
Goya's painting becoming a border of heart shaped poison 
ivy. The positions of the two couples opens up an empty 
centre to the canvas...loss,(this painting is pictured). 
If many of the paintings feature a white or black 
hole or equivalent (VII gets a splat of white paint), 
they are also festooned with orifices. The open mouth 
of the Grace Jones like head (III), filled with toothy 
white skulls, the presence of death is also the trad-
itional painterly device of the open window, with a 
second window behind the face- views to other worlds. 
Clemente's pictures are filled with constant open mouths, 
eyes, nostrils and anus's. 
Here I should mention the series of eleven drawings 
that Clemente made for the catalogue of 'The Stations', 
on transparent paper anddesignedto be read a first 
through a second. Each drawing relates to one of the 
paintings, except for painting II which has no drawing; 
and isolates an element in its painting, the drawing 
Francesco Clemente. 1981/82 
I, Encaustic on canvas, 198cm by 223.5cm 
becoming a sign of its subject and equally imprecise 
and open in its meaning as its original symbol referent. 
For instance, three freshly pulled red teeth, emblems 
of picture III the large face with skull-teeth, are 
aligned along the axis on which on the reverse side, 
a sanskrit swastika rotates- a figure of four black 
limbs with yellow stripes to the left of the disrobing 
Christ of picture IV. 
Cycles, circles, Clemente represents the journey, 
the journey of the stations as the world turned upside 
down. Two of the paintings (II and VII) can be read 
either way up. The sequence of the paintings implies 
a pilgrimage of transformation, in which the drawings 
act like the illustrations in medieval texts concerning 
ritual purification and initiation. 
There have been two great interpretations of the 'Stations 
of the Cross' theme in the last thirty years, Matisse's 
Chapelle du Rosaire in Venice and Barnett Newman's series 
of paintings from the period 1958-66, both black on white 
signs of tragedy. 31 
By contrast Clemente makes no attempt to deal with Christ's 
passion in a universal/transcendental way. His paintings 
express a vision of the stations in a personal auto-
biographical manner which admits images of modern life 
and cultural history simultaneously. 
Clemente is aware of contemporary criticism. He in-
corporates his understanding of the real world and his 
stance as the artist 'pictured' in his self-portraits 
which occur continually in his allegorical paintings. 
The hiatus erected in his drawings and the stories of 
'The Stations' in the pictures themselves, is part 
of the 'extended metaphor' of Clemente's own journey 
through culture and the world. 
Clemente's allegoriea, like all allegories, are uncom-
fortable. There is an over-riding sense of the artists's 
will to fiction, of the allegorist's desire to convince 
the reader of his fiction while they are always at the 
same time reading the artist. His pictures' basic strength 
lies in his painting and the understated charm of his 
drawing, which conveys a poetry that tends to mitigate 
some of the allegory's discomforting potential. 
The story of allegory as it stands reads like the 
house that Jack built, but there is no doubt that allegory 
is surviving as a mode of artistic expression. If all-
egory has until lately been out of favour, that it 
has come back to us in a modified form is not surprising. 
It has always owned the capability for modification 
of form. If for two hundred years it has been spurned, 
it is because for two hundred years Romantic expression 
has dominated man's aesthetic consciousness. The prosaic 
mentality of the Puritans to which allegory could have 
been ideally suited as a socio-historically reflective 
form, neglected allegory; Puritan observance of faith 
was private, outside the self-consciousness of art. 
It is that 'inconvenience', as Dr Johnson put it, 
that 'art aping science' (Croce), that knotted the noose 
round its neck. A forlorn skeleton dug up by postmodern 
critics, it has been applied willy-nilly and after the 
fact to postmodern artwork that exhibits the same trapped 
outside-itself, endless invoking of the sign, self-
referentiality. Allegory for both Paul de Man and Craig 
Owens is an ironic device to describe an activity of 
consciousness by which man designates himself from the 
non-human world. While allegory has shown it can accomo-
date a new use so broad as to almost make it meaningless, 
this new use does not itself negate the contemporary 
act of deliberate allegory where it occurs. 
The allegorical skeleton is desirable to linguistic 
man in other ways beyond its manner of declaring the 
fictiveness of its fictions. Allegory the skeleton, has 
the same old capacity for appetite as the dragon-whore, 
a commodious abdominal cavity; a likely place for a 
linguisticism that levels all fields of human knowledge 
to words,_signs. Allegory is a difficult art form, though 
perhaps now critically inevitable, but it always was. 
If it exists, then only as a mediated act of will of 
both artist and reader. Though tinged with the melan-
choly of self consciousness, allegory is, above all 
a vehicle of beliefs, and if you have forsaken belief, 
then the home of belief is your only retreat. 
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THE CONSOLATION OF NARRATIVE. 
The Postmodern Approach to Narrative and History. 
Seminar Paper 11. 
In this essay I talk about the place narrative occupies 
in postmodern ideas and the closing relationship between 
fictional narrative and historical narratives, or hist-
oriography. I discuss this in the light of the poetic 
quest to establish something essential beyond the end 
result of deconstruction theory, outside language. For 
those of us wary of utopian spirtualism, who see it 
as cocooned from the material realities of life; I 
present the consolatory order of narrative, its limit-
ations well noted, as a more useful comfort. 
Levi-Strauss has said that myths are recognizable 
through translation from one idiom into another, more 
or less what Barthes claimed about narrative with the 
phrase, "narrative is translatable without fundamental 
damage", as a lyric poem is not And they mean that 
both myth and narrative are metacodes, observing certain 
structural principles widely cross-culturally recognized 
even while the content of either form is not. 
Myth appears to have a kind of universalism, and 
the attraction here is that its universalism allows 
the concealment of the split between the subject that 
tells the story about itself and the subject it tells 
about. It is not possible to deconstruct myth without 
destroying it. Myth needs belief whereas narrative 
needs only the willing suspension of disbelief. Narrative 
can be deconstructed to expose its hidden assumptions 
without losing its capacity as a vehicle for clearly 
ordering information. 
Narrative has a number of distinguishing character- 
istics. It has a beginning and an ending, as opposed 
to the 'real' world. It is a progressive, temporal 
sequence of events, a discourse always presented in 
the past tense as a condition of its manufacture which 
is that events must be closed before they can be narr-
ated. In English, narrative and fiction have been 
synonymous expressions. 
Now the postmodernists, through semiotics, have extend-
ed the term narrative to include all discourses which 
employ the codes which allow the constructionof history 
as a progressive temporal sequence, for example, science 
or history, as they examine the assumptions this progress-
ion conceals. 
Deconstruction of a text begins when we locate the 
moment when the text transgresses the laws it appears 
to set up for itself. All texts may be deconstructed. 
Barthes' reading of Balzac's 'Sakrasine' is a clear 
example of how a classic narrative text can be seen 
to buckle and deconstruct under the strain of its own 
textual production. He implies that the same process 
of construction is to be found in any extended narrative. 
Barthes developed five codes of connotation in 'S/V. 
They correspond to the five major critical languages 
of our time: the thematic, narrative, psychological, 
sociological, and psychoanalytic criticisms, con-
ceived as five active and interactive organizations 
all of which are essential for any act of reading a 
text. The narrative or proairetic code gives a text 
passage, its propulsion forward in a constant process 
of 'naming'. It is this naming and the consequent desire 
to finish the sequence that ensures a text readability 
as a story. 
The sense in which the language is recognized as 
itself, the destruction of the illusion of a natural 
or metaphysical bond between signifier and signified, 
is what primarily constitutes the postmodern approach 
to narrative. Through this there is a freedom from the 
limitations of realist - style narrative with an inherent 
progression of time, events, and a beginning and an 
end; a limit. 
In a narrative which rejects the violence of contain-
ment, which refuses to construct a single coherent meaning, 
elements all belong to the incidental. The elements 
are still allowed to combine to form meaning but they 
refer outside the narrative at the same time. The lack 
of closure in the open narrative is used to form a non- 
hierarchial ,shifting, and style and form become the 
principal characters. 
For an example of a narrative which denies closure, 
we could take Laurie Anderson asking of the gesturing 
figure on Apollo 10, "Do you think they will think his 
hand is permanently attached that way, or do you think 
they will read our signs? In our country good-bye looks 
just like hello". 
Craig Owens explains here that Anderson is not con-
cerned with the possible multiplicity of readings of 
a gesture, but in 'two clearly defined but mutually 
incompatable readings engaged in blind confrontation 
in such a way as it makes it impossible to choose between 
them '. 2 Reading is left suspended in its own uncert-
ainty. While in the visual arts, a 1980 drawing by Eric 
Fischl called 'Bathroom Scene', has a boy standing in 
front of a sink and mirror squeezing a pimple, while 
behind him a woman sprawls on the floor. The scene is 
a composite of four overlapping sheets of imperfectly 
transparent greenish glassine paper each with a component 
of the story - boy, woman, sink and mirror and a bathtub. 
This forms an open narrative because the sheets are 
tacked up so the relationship between the parts is 
clearly provisional, one of a number of possible arrange-
ments for a story. 3 
Postmodernism incorporates a way of thinking about 
the relationship between man and the universe in which 
new scientific and metaphysical thought, influences 
art practice and writing. From science and psychoan-
alysis the narrative element in postmodern works has 
taken the dynamic contraries-of experience that deal 
with uncertainties, inconstancies, double premises, 
paradoxes as a way of escaping the systems of logic 
which link traditional narrative to being viewed from 
a fixed position. 
Conventions of thought which allow a shared meaning 
within a culture become indivisible from the ideology 
behind them. The postmodernist objection to narrative 
is that it sets itself up as a complete form with a 
hierarchy of order in its desire to progress to the 
end. This chain of events masks the determinist structure 
of narrative, which may well contradict and undermine 
the meaning of the text. 
The continuity of Foucault's research, for example, 
in fact rested from the outset on the appeal to an 
untamed primal experience anterior to all the successive 
orders of Western Reason, and subversive of them, in 
whose eyes their common nature as repressive structures 
stands revealed. 
With no commitment to exploration of social realities 
at all, •errida had little compunction in undoing the 
constructions of Foucault, convicting him of a 'nost-
algia of origins', pre-Socratic. What right, asked 
Derrida, had Foucault to assume, on his own premise, 
the validity of his discourse? How could a history of 
madness be written, 'from within the very language of 
classical reason itself, utilizing the concepts that 
were the historical Instruments of the capture of mad- 
,4 ness . 
The uncertainty principle in science quantum theory 
has been used by literary theorists to develop a new, 
non-hierarchical form of knowledge accumulation, not 
only less determined than the naturally unfolding text, 
but potentially more useful to humans and sympathetic 
to other life. 
In response to this and in opposition to the root-
tree image as a model for rationality, Deleuze and 
Guattari devised the rhizome theory. A plant whose 
stems, all the same thickness, lead off in all dir-
ections, 
... the rhizome stands for a non-hierarchical a-centred 
field of knowledge. It stands for multiplicity as opposed 
to the principle of unity and for open-ended creation 
of new ideas as opposed to the reproduction or repetition 
of established patterns. A rhizomatic philosophy would 
not be governed by any transcendental plan,.. but rather 
it would be a philosophy which functioned in connection 
with non-philosophy, which might be useful to musicians 
or mathematicians even and especially when it doesn't 
speak about music or mathematics. 5 
Borrowing the lingo of numerous separate fields of 
knowledge and ignoring what are in any respect quite 
arbitrary boundaries, the rhizome makes odd cross-fert-
ilizations, hoping to be useful as a system of thinking 
which applies to that which it does not describe. 
While this is a freedom on the one hand, on the other 
is the desire of the reader to resort to conventions, 
to curtail freedom, to make something 'real' of the 
text. When describing the 'cut-up method' to produce 
the accident of spontaneity, Frank Kermode said, 
such accidents work happily only when we can detect some. 
allusion direct or ironical to our inherited notion of 
linguistic and narrative structure. 6 
In the same way, Deleuze and Guattari put themselves as 
an alternative, not contradiction to the inherited notions 
(which their theory only attempts to supplement), start-
ing with the scientific convention of the model. 
A breakdown of order, a collapsed narrative, a narra-
tive in which the signs of order and form are contin-
uously presented but always with a sign of cancellation, 
can reach a point where nothing whatever is communicated. 
The device of dislocation is meaningless without refer-
ence to some prior condition. Kermode goes on to say, 
'The absolutely New is unintelligible even as novelty '? 
In other words it is impossible to totally eliminate 
narrative by simple opposition. It can be made less 
and less effective in which case it loses its useful-
ness altogether, or in its frustration can become a 
kind of metaphor or allegory of the postmodern condition. 
Logic, grammar and rhetoric are not inert aspects 
of language but disjunct dimensions which can undermine 
one another'sauthority. The problem is that language 
is unable to both say and show what it means. According 
to Paul de Man, 'considered as persuasion, rhetoric 
is performative but when considered as a system of tropes, 
it deconstructs its own performance ,8 ; so even decon-
structive critisism falls prey to its own critique. 
What is more, historical thinking is not possible 
except in terms of tropes. When a historian orders the 
material of a study, it is rendered 	manageable by the 
silent application of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche 
and irony. 
If history is to have a claim on truth then it must 
have the subject, distinct from the structure. If, in 
the name of semiotic purity, (and it is certainly not 
in the name of social equity), we dismiss the authorative 
fixed origin, then the structure also dissolves its 
fixed boundaries, and what is left is a floating subject-
ivity, or unreliable author. 
The unreliable author leaves a text without a limit 
since the author is the final signified. Without a limit 
there is no credibility of the claim of the critic to 
decipher the text, at least not in the conventional 
sense. The task of the critic is no longer to reveal 
truth, but to discover pleasure, magic, in the text. 
In 1967 Susan Sontag came up with the term 'Against 
Interpretation', a more pleasurable and adventurous 
alternative to interpretive criticism and what Barthes 
was later to call the t erotics of the text'. 
It is a desire to put back poetics into writing, 
to quite self consciously employ the metaphoric in 
critical writing to invoke the mysterious, (that which 
cannot be named), using the poetic language of mystery. 
It was both explained and justified in psychoanalytic 
terms as arising out of and operating through pre-
articulate need. As Kristeva explains, 
We would follow the hypothesis according to which the 
infant, prompted by separation (note the necessity of 
a 'lack' if the sign is to arise), produces or utilizes 
objects or vocalizations that are the symbolic equivalent 
of that lacking. 9 
The creative act is set in motion in response to 
absence even as it is undermined by it, but what matters 
is the gracefulness of language, 'for life given without 
infinity aspires to find its supplement of lacework 
within words t l ° 
Kristeva links narrative to the rational when she 
calls it 'the most elaborate attempt, next to syntactic 
competence to situate a speaking being between his desires 
and their prohibitions'. And she goes on to say that 
the struggle to 'touch the intimate nerve' is not won 
through narrative but through much deeper, more remote 
and riskier probes' 1. 1  From the tone of striving which 
Kristeva here uses, it seems that for her the !intimate 
nerve', is a static absolute, or a kind of truth, to 
be arrived at through the use of a new rationale of 
language. 
A major postmodern criticism of history is its need 
to attach itself to truth at some point. In the next 
part of the paper I intend to present the 'truth of 
history', and the stability of the structure of narrative 
which history needs, in order to be comprehensible, as 
useful fictions. 
There are two meanings of the word 'history':(a) 
the events of the past, and (b) telling a story about 
the events of the past. Postmodernism makes it clear 
that history is always 'narrated', and that therefore 
the first sense is untenable. The past can never be 
available to us in pure form, but always in the form 
of representations. The postmodern approach argues that 
there is no stable or fixed 'history' which can be treated 
as the background against which literature can be fore-
grounded. All history is foreground. 'History' is always 
a matter of telling a story about the past, using other 
texts as inter-texts. Non-literary texts of theology, 
law, history, should not be regarded differently from 
literary wOrks which should not be regarded as trans-
cendent expression of the 'human spirit', but as texts 
among others. 
In "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation 
of Reality", Hayden White describes historiography as 
a good ground on which to consider the nature of narr-
ativity, because historiography shows the contest between 
the imperatives of the real arid the desire for an imposed 
meaning. 
As examples of non-narrative forms he calls attention 
to the annals form and the chronicle, both types of 
historical listings. The chronicle he describes as 
attempting to narrate but without concluding, rather 
simply coming to an end and therefore, falling short 
of narrative. The annals form is just a list of events. 
His example is from Saint Gall of events that occurred 
in Gaul in the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries, 
709. Hard winter Duke Gottfrieddied. 
710. Hard year and deficient in crops. 
711. 
712. Flood everywhere. 12 
He equates lack of narrative with an unwillingness 
to narrate, which makes the annal anti-narrative. Without 
the imposed meaning of the narrative, the annal makes 
no sense, it cannot be 'read'. History proper manifests 
narrative closure through an imposition of a 'moral' 
meaning, an 'endowment of events real or imaginary with 
a significance they do not possess as a mere sequence, .13 
White calls the distinction of historicism unthink-
able without the presupposition of a system of law in 
relation to which a specifically legal subject could 
be constituted. Historical self-consciousness is con-
ceivable only in terms of its interest in law, or more 
generally, authority. I take this authority to include 
in the end, the authority of the text. Where there is 
ambivalence regarding the status of the legal system, 
then the elosure of a story one might wish to tell about 
the past is lacking. In other words an historical account 
has both to display the narrative form and a political 
content. 
Narrative is a discourse that speaks itself and real 
events do not speak themselves. A law of discourse states 
that the fact that something is true is never sufficient 
reason for saying it. The difference between early forms 
of historical recordings and the modern history is the 
declaration of objectivity which has attached the form 
of the narrative itself to the truth, the real. 
A historical narrative claims truth not merely for each 
of its individual statements taken distributively, but 
for the complex form of the narrative itself. 14 
So as soon as one questions the truth of the form, the 
truth of the events themselves are open to question. 
In order to qualify as historical, an event must 
be susceptable to at least two narratives of its occurr-
ence, otherwise a historian has no reason to bestow upon 
him/herself the authority of giving the true account. A 
moral objective presupposes that the immanece of a 
conventional narrative is also present in the historical 
text and the nature of the immanence means that real 
events achieve their reality, not through the fact that 
they occurred but the fact that they are capable of 
finding a place in a chronologically ordered sequence. 
Through the structuration and implication of the 
narrative discourse, Robert Scholes writes, 'the events 
themselves have become humanized- saturated with meaning 
and value- at the stage of their entextualization and 
again at the stage of interpretation ,15  . A meaning is 
being imposed on reality, complete in a way we can 
never experience but only imagine. 
One of the apparent differences between historical 
and fictional narrative is that while both attest to 
the prior existence of their entextualized events, fiction 
does so through a convention of deceit, a mutual contract 
between writer and reader to suspend disbelief. Histor-
ical narrative is not recognized within the convention 
of deceit because the events were said to have occurred, 
and could if necessary be proved or disproved. 
Walter Benjamin presents a metaphoric rather than 
narrative view of history, which postmodernism considers 
a better alternative, because it does not say "this 
happened", but "for us, this happened". 
Benjamin's materialism allowed him to view history's 
chain of events as an invention at the service of prog-
ress and progress an invention at the service of the 
ruling classes through organization and control of those 
who possess nothing other than their own labour. Progress 
is the force that pushes history's events through time. 
Historicism is a vehicle for ideology because it accepts 
as given the way in which ruling classes have defined 
history; 'all rulers are the heirs of those who conquered 
before them.., empathy with the victor invariably benefits 
16 the rulers'. 
Rather than the suspect convention of the single 
chain of events, Benjamin imagined history as a 'single 
,17 catastrophe , a great pile of wreckage. Without hoping 
to recognize the past as it really was, he suggested that 
the present could seek to construct history from a 
standpoint in the present, by recognizing a similar 
concern in essence, of an earlier epoch; and that 'the 
past carries with it a temporal index by which it is 
referred to redemption., .18  
Adorno wrote that 'to understand Benjamin properly 
one must feel behind his every sentence the conversion 
of extreme agitation into something static, indee'd the 
19 static notion of movement itself'. This static quality 
is the very opposite of narrative. 
Benjamin adhered to a mimetic theory of language 
thoughout his lifetime. For him words are conceived 
as names; 'naming is a translation of the language of 
nature, which is more incomplete, into the language 
of human beings, . 20  The mimetic capacity is the mark 
of an original dependency on the forces of nature. 
Benjamin's messianic interpretation of history, links 
history to the possibility of timeless redemption, to 
be reached through the 'divine' attempts of critical 
interpretation to retain the powers of mimesis, while 
loosening the dependency on nature. 21 For these reasons 
Benjamin's history retains trace links to both nature 
and the spiritual, that are not part of postmodernism's 
re-evaluation of 'history'. 
It is the aim of a postmodern discourse to reveal the 
numerous codes of knowledge or conventional wisdom that 
we 'naturally' know about; those 'natural' truths that 
tell us that time moves forward in a line or that we 
really see according to the organization produced by 
perspective. 
Postmodernism seeks a new perspective through the 
marginal discourses of feminism, criminology, insanity, 
defined in relation to the concepts of patriarchy, justice 
or sanity. These latter discourses have determined and 
constrained the forms of knowledge, the types of norm-
ality and the nature of subjectivity which have prevailed 
in particular periods. For instance, subversion thought 
of as an inward necessity: we define our identities 
always in relation to what we are not, and therefore 
what we are not must be objectified as 'others'. The 
mad, the unruly, the alien, are internalized 'others' 
which help us to consolidate our identities. Their 
existance is allowed only as evidence of the rightness 
of established power. On the other hand, every history 
of subversion also contains a history of resistance, 
and that resistance is not just a symptom of and just-
ification for subjection, but is the 'true mark of an 
ineradicable 'difference' which always prevents power 
from closing up change ,22. 
Poetics will, if not already, appear unforgivably 
heartless unless it again, as it did when it first tried 
to put back emotional nourishment into critical writ- 
ings , puts itself to some real use. By linking its 
metaphor to narrative, poetics can be made more access-
ible, but will continue its course of resistance. 
Narrative seems to fill a need. 'It represents one 
23 of the great anthropological forms of perception'. 
It can make useful sense of a world that we can only 
know about through language. On the one side of the 
work is the strategy of persuasion undertaken by the 
author and on the other side is the reader's willing 
suspension of disbelief. However, the rhetoric of diss-
imulation and irony where defamiliarization replaces 
persuasion- the unreliable narrator-, has made the 
strategy of persuasionincreasinglyself defeating. As 
Kermode will have it, 'it is not that we are connoiss-
eurs of .chaos, but that we are surrounded by it, and 
equipped for co-existence with it only by our fictive 
powersq 4 
Derrida's definition of position as resisting and 
disorganizing without ever constituting a third term, 
should make make the organization of history possible 
without narrative, were it not that post-structuralist 
postmodernism is doomed to failure because only by saying 
nothing can it avoid the assertion of truths. Even with 
limitations, narrative has, as I have said, taken on 
a new flexibility and accountability. Foucault and other 
historicists have attempted to write histories of the 
'other', even if it is not possible to write, or at 
least be read, from the position of the 'other'- it 
is more useful than silence. 
History relies on a similar fictional attachment 
to the 'real' as the form of narrative. Because however, 
unlike myth, fictions call for conditional assent, they 
are the 'agents of change', as 'they change as the needs 
25 of sense making change'. 
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DOCUMENTATION OF WORK PRACTICE 
"There is no document of civilization which is not at the same 
time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not 
free of barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it 
was transmitted from one owner to another." Walter Benjamin, 
"Theses on the Philosophy of History", 1940. 
M.F.A. Proposal, Joanna Flynn, March 1988. 
My interest is in narratives. This has developed 
over the last two or three years, from a way of con-
structing pictures to a wish to focus on narrative as 
the content as well as the vehicle. I intend an explor-
ation of the idea of personal and private narrative, 
juxtaposed with public narrative, eg. as these narratives 
are intended to be a unified assemblage of disparate 
parts, both textual and pictorial; using personal poems, 
firsthand anecdotes, my own fiction and quotes from 
other personal sources, also private photographs, draw-
ings and jokes, and on the public side; documents, 
archival material relating to legislative and judicial 
decisions made by community councils in Australia and 
England, used sparingly. The narratives shall then, 
be both written and illustrated. 
I shall employ the services of a ghost hero, a sort 
of hold-all animus who becomes the itinerant master 
•of ceremonies or the eternal victim, the artist as a 
young manimus if you like. (Why? Because every good 
narrative needs a hero and I don't have the shoulders 
for it). 
My role as an artist is evocative. At the minute 
I intend my influences for these pictures to be, the 
photo-print collages from the 60's and early 70's of 
Robert Rauschenberg;,his pictures of America, the 'Stoned-
Moon' series. Also, the powerful Mayakovsky exhibition 
that toured Australia last year which showed the process 
of deification (of the artist), through the use of photo-
graphs and biographical material, and as well, the 
writings of Richard Brautigan, the sixties pop poet of 
San Francisco. The works of these two artists were 
terribly evocative of the time in which they were 
manufactured but are sufficiently successful as works 
of art, not to have simply become period pieces. 
What shall I evoke? Whatever is left me after I forego 
a stance of guilt or virtue, a sense of our time. 
The comparison of the personal and the public will 
tend to evoke, after all, the sense of melancholy and 
yearning called nostalgia; a personal awareness in the 
viewer of things outside themselves, past, the loneliness 
of thinking about deeds good and bad whilst in a comfort-
able environment- the gallery. 
PART 2. 
Now my narrative has a theme, and the intended theme 
for the two years broadly is to be 'THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE 
IN AUSTRALIA'. By this I mean an exploration of the 
beginnings of law in England (whence came our laws), 
and then in Australia to the present, the philosophical 
notions behind justice in Australia- the ideas of chivalry 
and justice itself. 
My theme grew from an interest last year in law as 
a thing of beauty and amusement- I lived with my law 
student brother- and an interest in personal histories 
because my work was to cook meals for elderly people 
incapable of much activity but fully capable of speech, 
so a year was spent listening to their personal narratives. 
This led to an awareness of my own lack of knowledge 
of history of any kind (except art history) that related 
to the lives of people. So I began to read history and 
the two histories I began were McAulay's History of  
England, and Manning Clark's History of Australia, both 
works that should continue to be my references, mainly 
because both men write with accomplishment and an obvious 
bias Which I enjoy. 
March 1990. 
On re-reading my proposal of March 1988, I consider 
that I have fulfilled my thematic objective. That is, 
I have devised a body of work that deals with 'The 
Origins of Justice in Australia', both as a moral idea 
and as a manifestation of the justice system. However, 
the manner in which I went about my examination was 
rather different to how I had envisaged in my proposal, 
in that even from the first little emblematic pictures 
it was clear that if I was making narrative, it was 
a metaphoric narrative. The treatment of my theme through 
metaphor connects all my pictures, from the word pictures 
through the lithographs and etchings and as well, the 
collages. 
Without at that time having read of the post-modern 
re-evaluation of allegory 1 , I began making allegory 
because it simply was the only way for me to give ideas 
a body. So the idea of narrative changed to allegory 
and the personal hero was exchanged for the more ambiguous 
embodiment of an idea of a historical 'hero', or the 
great personage in history. The personal narratives 
were exchanged for the social aspect of allegory. 
In my pictures I am accountable as a member of the 
English cultural system I am criticizing. And it is 
important that I say that because I initially imagined 
I could/should, remain outside the system I was describing 
in order to avoid a moral stance with its attendant 
implication of blame. But I have been quite unable to 
make pictures of the justice system and its functions 
in the relations of people, without having some kind 
of moral position. Justice is a senseless idea without 
ideas of right and wrong, yet while I think my moral 
position is much the same as the general morals held 
by society, it is at odds with the justice dispensed 
by our government and judiciary. 
Depicting executioners, soldiers, judges, convicts, 
I depict the idea of people that lived/live their lives 
as individuals who in one sense were/are embodiments 
of ideas 2 . In the need for community coherence, personal 
moral responsibility is waived before the force of other 
abstracts that bond the community together. Yet without 
becoming heroes, individuals can bring.about worthwhile 
change; so while my allegorical figures represent the 
culture of which I am critical, they also represent 
the individual where I tend to put my hopes. 
As far as the construction of the picture goes, I 
. found I could make a more unified image through drawing, 
so I discarded the idea of using photographs, except 
as references. I also tended to use different texts 
than those I suggested I might use in my proposal, 
finding I didn't need such extensive histories, either 
of England or Australia, but rather, needed to know 
how History worked, (which I explored in my second paper), 
and how the system of justice we have in Australia, 
worked. I needed to read about the position of art in 
contemporary society, how language works and about the 
history of morals. I have supplied a list of the books 
that I have used directly as references for my work 
and in the notes on my pictures. Other sources will 
be found in the bibliographies of my papers. 
3 Legal Positivism and Natural Law. 
Implicit Law: this is a kind of habit, eg. 'How you catch 
fish'. 
Customary Law: also the way things are, however the 
customary has become the 'reason' for doing the thing. 
Some awareness of the possible use of an alternative, 
that this is how things are but that there might be other 
ways other than past ways. 
An expanding society- including the Roman case-, pro-
vides for a class who keep a record of rules, priests 
or learned men. These men also, as well as custodians, 
serve as interpreters of custom, and form an elite. 
• 	A further expanding and increasingly literate society 
wants to read these codes for themselves. Written publicat-
ion of the codes already established by custom are 
followed by an awareness that specific changes can be 
made in society, in the codes. This means an end to 
spontaneous development. 
Maine says that the next step is , not open declaration 
of a new law, but legal reform under the cover of fict-
ions. 'Legal Fictions', introduce change through operation 
modification, averting the superstitious disrelish for 
change always present, eg. the fiction of Adoption -
artificial family ties. This seems to grow out of a need 
for a harmonious fitting in with the changed laws to 
the remaining laws. 
Natural Law: the fifth stage is, not surprisingly, trans- 
cendent. It is a kind of law that grows out of an ideal 
N-r- from some 'lost past', originally growing out of an act 
of commerce. It was a way of de'obscuring' the law from 
its ritual, in order to make it useable for widely diver-
gent cultures. This Roman type of law was gradually 
joined to the notion from Greek philosophy, that all 
legal systems were derived from some original model of 
elegant, simple lines. By stripping the corruptions, 
the essential unity of legal systems might be revealed-
a lost code of nature, from natural justice, a natural 
law. Like the fiction then, the later reform of this 
idea thought of itself as bringing forth something pre-
existing. 
Maine states that these changes are progressive and 
linked to the evolution of society. In fact they tend 
to be jumbled, though the more literate societies use 
more of the stages than the pre-literate societies. In 
other words, 'primitive' societies sometimes made explicit 
law, and modern law often employs fictions, eg. the 
invitation of the see-saw to a child onto property. 
Modern legislators mix in uncertain proportions law 
'finding', with law making. Finding is a judicial decision 
based on considered opinion and interpretation rather 
than in the letter of the law. A law 'found' by a Judge 
is thus, in practice, a 'made law' of sorts. 
Rivalry in governing hierarchy makes function more un-
certain which can be a rivalry of the customary and 
the statutory. 
A fiction which says that everyone in the Kingdom 
is deemed to be a party to the proceedings of Parliament 
when it acts as a legislative body, serves to keep the 
powerful intent of legislation- though it may be published 
in a form inaccessible to the citizen. This fiction still 
exists. As a law has to be interpreted, it can be seen 
as never coming from its legislator wholly and fully 
made'. Contradictory laws emanating from the same law 
maker are generally dealt with as the last in order of 
time shall be prefered to the first. (Alexander Hamilton, 
1788).Only made laws carry clear indication of the date 
of its inception. However, the idea of the latest pre- 
vailing, would be at odds with an idea of a society fallen 
from a state of former perfection to which it is hoped 
to return. 
Constitutions are written to control the making of 
laws, or the circumstances of their making, but they 
become impossible unless the draughtsman can assume that 
the legislator shares with him some implicit notions 
of the limits of legal decency and sanity. Laws should 
be general or address a body rather than a private or 
one-man statute. 
1. Normal processes for making law can fail or fall into 
confusion; human perfidy is only one of these. 
2. In the process of making legality again recognizable 
no guidance can be obtained from a philosophy which asserts 
that the only true law is made law. It must be made before 
it can be truth. 
3. The legal measures for this process may be reprehensible, 
eg. retrospective statute. 
Kings: the problem with a sole law maker, which may seem 
to be a simple way of making laws, is the cessation of 
the term of the king, either through death or deposition. 
Adjunctive Law: emerges from the decision of actual cont-
roversies. In a judicial decision under common law the 
rule applied to the case and the reason for that rule 
are both stated in the opinion of the Judge and may be 
indistinguishable. 
A statute normally gives no justificatory statement, 
merely an injunctive; this shall be done, this forbidden. 
Common laws do not tend to be impersonal, they don't 
tend to say that the citizen should think right. They 
are, at least at bottom, more explanatively reasonable. 
The Origins and Development of Common Law. 4 
The central theme of Mediaeval culture was the Christian 
faith. The people of the Middle Ages were religious and 
practical. The aim of religious occupation was salvation. 
The Roman conception of an Emperor as secular head 
• of Christendom survived throughout the Middle Ages, despite 
its lack of relevance to political reality. The King 
was appointed by God to rule, consecrated •in a religious 
ceremony that gave him religious attributes. He was the 
source of the law and the fountain of justice, appointed 
to rule for the benefit of his people and expected, though 
not compelled, to observe his own law, 
English and Australian legal institutions are founded, 
historically and conceptually, on the common law. 
Henry 11, 1154-1189, is credited with the development 
of what would become the common law system. Much later, 
it was modified and supplemented by a distinct, though 
partial, body of law based on a concept of fairness; 
alleviating the rigours of the common law and called 
equity. In the nineteenth century the two were joined 
and now all non-statutory law applied in English and 
Australian courts is called common-law. 
Common law is usually thought of as a Judge made law, 
some sources for which were customs, but mostly arrived 
at through the Judges' notions of fairness, consolidated 
by their shared culture. 
Henry 11 set about •extending the jurisdiction of the 
Royal Courts through royal justices. The justices would 
go on circuits and though each popular or feudal court 
had its own customary law, the royal justices took with 
them the King's law, so when they conducted a case, it 
was the King's law they represented. 
Systematically, Henry decreased the operations of 
feudal courts, redirecting cases to his own courts. 
In all courts, guilt or innocence was determined by 
the water trial, (trial by ordeal),- unless a trial by 
combat was requested-, which worked on the principle 
that water blessed by a priest would reject the guilty 
person. 
Henry' was also responsible for the altered use of 
the Norman idea of the jury, which became the predecessor 
of the modern jury. 
In 1215 the clergy were forbidden from participating 
in the trial, which meant that no-one could be tried, 
unless the accused requested a jury,( a jury could only 
be requested). In order to convince all accused persons 
to request a jury, the accused were threatened with torture. 
The petty jury became the normal means of trying criminal 
cases. 
King John, 1199-1216, had an enthusiasm for making 
new taxes, with the result that the barons of England 
insisted that the King and his judges stop making new 
laws. In 1215 King John signed the Magna Carta. The overall 
importance of this document was that the King admitted 
that he was subject to the law. Two of the provisions 
of Magna Carta had lasting significance. One was that, 
except on certain recognized occasions, the King would 
not raise a levy without the consent of a council of 
tenants-in-chief; which became the basis for parliamentary 
control of taxation. The other provision, chapter thirty 
nine, states: 
No free man shall be imprisoned, or deprived of his property, 
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed nor shall we 
go against him or send against him unless by legal judgement 
of his peers or by the law of the land. 
This is the basis for the modern idea of personal freedom. 
The government can take no legal action against an in-
dividual without proper legal procedures. This applied 
to all free men, (in 1215 less than half the population 
of England were free men). 
It took until the late fourteenth century before 
bureaucracies developed that were composed of officials 
who thought of themselves as servants of the Crown rather 
than the King. Until then a criminal offence was committed on 
an individual and his family, to whom recompense could 
be made. After this time the accused would be prosecuted 
by the Crown in the interests of the nation. The crime 
had moved from being treason against the body of the 
King to a treason against the abstract hegemony of the 
state, through the Crown. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, English law 
had developed a distinction between conquered or ceded 
colonies and settled colonies. The existing law in a 
conquered or ceded colony continued in force until altered 
by Parliment or the Crown, (and the extent of the Crown's 
legislative authority in such a colony was considerable). 
In a settled colony the common law, so far as it was 
appropriate, occupied the land with the settlers- a form 
of intellectual baggage. 
Australia was occupied before 1788 but it was classed 
•as terra nullius- land not owned- and a settled colony, 
for the purposes of international law. Laws were received 
by the colony as necessary, with a real desire to cling 
to English Law. 
After the seventeenth century, judges could no longer 
be appointed, suspended or dismissed at the pleasure 
of the Crown. They are now appointed (supposedly), inde-
pendently of government and subject. 
The jury system tends to be regarded by the legal 
profession as a crude way of establishing the truth. 
The coroner'sjury is now either rare or abolished. Civil 
jury is rare except for Victoria and New South Wales, 
the two busiest jurisdictions. Criminal jury trial is 
still common. However in difficult, highly technical 
matters it may be uncertain whether the jury can properly 
understand the evidence; nonetheless the right of the 
defendant to a trial by judgement of his peers remains 
valued. 
5 Morals- a brief description. 
There are two main groups of morals, known by many names 
and sub-divided into many groups. One is generally known 
as the stoical, the intuitive, the independent or the 
sentimental: the other as the epicurean, the inductive, 
the utilitarian, or the selfish. 
Of the former: a belief that we have a natural power 
of perceiving that some qualities, such as benevolence, 
chastity or veracity, are better than others and should 
be cultivated whilst their opposites should be repressed. 
By the constitution of our nature, the notion of right 
carries with it a feeling of obligation; that to say 
a course of conduct is our duty is, in itself, and apart 
from all consequences, an intelligible and sufficient 
reason for practising it; and that we derive the first 
principles of our duty from intuition. 
On the other hand is the school that denies we have 
any such natural perception- we are without knowledge 
of merits or otherwise, and derive these notions from 
observation of the course of life. That which makes these 
actions good is they increase happiness or diminish 
the pain of mankind. Thus demerit, the opposite. 
To procure the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number of people is therefore the highest aim of the 
moralist. Of course the question is why, if not duty 
are we bound to perform these actions which will result 
in happiness for the most number as if we believe we 
are under a natural obligation to seek the happiness 
of others rather than our own, when the two interests 
conflict, then we are recognizing a moral faculty or 
natural sense of obligation. 
Hume pronounced utility to be the criterion and ess-
ential element of all virtue, but at the same time he 
defends the disinterested character of virtue when he 
said that it springs from a natural feeling of appro-
bation, .distinct from reason, and produced by a partic-
ular sense, or taste, which rises up within us at the 
contemplation of virtue or vice. The utilitarian concept 
of morals judges all actions and dispositions by their 
consequences: Moral in proportion to increase of happiness, 
immoral in their tendency to diminish happiness. Duty 
or ought, for Hume, means if we do not do a course of 
action, we shall suffer. The motive to virtue then, is 
enlightened self interest. Virtue is seen as what is 
good for society. 
Lecky has placed himself as an intuitive moralist. 
Although he admits that one culture will see different 
things as beautiful, for instance,- that a natural idea 
for good, bad, beautiful or ugly, is not universal but 
,a matter of cultural difference,- the reason he gives 
is that different cultures, or ages, operate on 'higher', 
or 'lower planes', and 'highly civilized man', share 
similar ideas of beautiful, good etc. But there is not 
a lot of evidence for this natural inclination, and the 
idea of 'higher' civilizations is now untenable. 
In a utilitarian regime of morals (through education), 
such as we now have in our society, except in certain 
spiritual communities, what is a moral course of action 
will readily be sacrificed for what is expedient, should 
the two conflict. 
6 Docile Bodies. 
By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become 
something that can be made: 
a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the 
body, mastering it, making it pliable.., turning silently into 
the automatism of habit. One has 'got rid of the peasant'. 
(ordinance of 20 March 1764). 7 
The classical age discovered the body as object and 
target of power. What was new about this was the manner 
in which docile bodies were made, the body was treated 
as a whole, but in little parts, -taking control over 
movements, attitudes, gestures, and brought about through 
constant coercion and supervision. 
Disciplinary methods had long been in existance, but 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the disci-
plines became general formulas of domination- different 
to slavery, the bodies were not owned, and different 
from service, in that the measures were free from the 
massive domination of the individual will of the master. 
There was the formation of a relation that in the 
mechanism itself, makes it more obedient as i,t becomes 
more useful, and conversely. Discipline increases the 
forces of the body, (in economic terms of utility), 
and diminishes these same forces ,(in political terms 
of obedience). 
The workings of the political anatomy had differnt 
origins; schools,hospitals, workshops- and came from 
different times.However, the techniques of discipline that 
8 they had in common, 'were always meticulous often minute , . 
'Discipline is a political anatomy of detail'? a meticulous 
observation of detail, and at the same time a political 
awareness of these small things, for the control and 
use of men, emerge through the classical age bearing•
with them, a whole set of techniques, a whole corpus 
of methods and knowledge, descriptions, plans, and data. 
And from such trifles the man of modern humanism was 
born. 
Discipline proceeds from the distribution of indiv-
iduals in space. It requires enclosure; individuals are 
segregated from the outside, and from each other, through 
architecture and rank. Then there is the control of 
activity through the measurement of time, and the dist-
ribution of various activities, through the correlation 
of the body and the gesture. 
A machine is constructed whose effect will be max-
imized by the concerted articulation of the elementary 
parts of which it is composed. Discipline is no longer 
simply an act of distributing bodies, of extracting time 
from them, and accumulating it, but of composing forces 
in order to obtain an efficient machine. 
Politics as a technique of internal peace and order, 
sought to implement the mechanism of the perfect army. 
In the great eighteenth century state, the army guaranteed 
civil peace no doubt because it was a real force, but 
also because it was a technique and a body of knowledge 
that could project their schema over the social body. 
The Napoleonic regime was not far off, and with it 
the form of state that was to survive it- the foundations 
of which were laid not only by jurists, but also by soldiers, 
not only councillors of state, but also junior officers, 
not only the men of the courts, but also the men of the 
camps. While the jurists or philosophers were seeking 
in the pact, a primal model for the constitution or 
construction of the social body; the soldiers, with the 
techniques of discipline, were elaborating procedures 
for the individual and collective coercion of bodies. 
10 Justice. 
These notes concern the origins of those aspects of 
justice to which I have chosen to give attention in my 
work. 
What does justice require, and through which conception 
of justice are the requirements to be assessed? 
Some conceptions of justice make the concept of desert central, 
while others deny it any relevance at all. Some conceptions 
appeal to inalienable human rights, others to some notion of 
social contract, others to a standard of utility '11 
The relationship of justice to human goods varies, 
as does the limit of the necessary similarity of persons 
to be included within a justice system; and further, 
is a knowledge of God's Law essential for ,justice? 
One of the most striking facts about modern political 
orders is that they lack institutionalized forms within 
which the fundamental disagreements over questions of 
what justice permits and requires, over conflicting 
conceptions'of justice, over systems ofreasonthat have 
radically different sources, (religious, social, economic), 
can be explored or resolved in any way. The facts of 
disagreement, themselves frequently go unacknowledged, 
disguised by a rhetoric of consensus. A divisive single 
issue, such as the Vietnam war or the concern over the 
environment, can illuminate the illusion of consensus. 
In Australia, a slowly growing number of independent 
political representatives, (who tend to represent a single 
area of concern), may reflect the community frustration 
with the abstraction of the issues from the background 
contexts of different and incompatible beliefs, from 
which the disagreements arise. 
Justice, like the other virtues, is valued both for 
its own sake and for the sake of the telos, the kind 
of life which it is best for human beings to live: because 
justice, like the other virtues, enables us to avoid 
those vicious states of character, incompatable with 
the living out of that kind of life. As an action 
pursued for its own sake, the whole notion of weighing 
requirements of justice against something else is, from 
the standpoint of the virtuous, a mistake. 
Aristotle, in book 1 of the Politics, gave reason 
for those who seek to acquire more and more money without 
limit, as, 'zeal for life, but not for the good life'.41. 
Yet from the standpoint of modern society, it is hard 
to understand this, when one of our central beliefs is 
that continuous economic growth is a fundamental good. 
Prices and wages have come to be understood as unrelated, 
-indeed in a modern economy could not be related- to 
desert in terms of labour, and the notion of a just 
price or just wage in our terms, makes no sense. 
The present conflicts which concern the nature of 
justice and its history, cannot be understood without 
a recognition of the degree to which it is an extension 
of a history of conflict found in the Athenian social 
and cultural order during the fifth and fourth centuries. 
The origins of Western justice which relates to Aust-
ralia, are ancient and numerous. They are to be found 
in the ideas of the Greek, the Jewish, the Islamic, through 
the tradition of Aristotle, later the Augustinian-
Christian ideas, and the English tradition though Hume. 
Justice for Homer presuposed that the universe has 
a single fundamental order, an order structuring both 
nature and society. There was no notion of the contrast 
of the natural and the social. Over this order presided 
Zeus, father of gods and human beings, and over particular 
communities, kings preside- dispensing, if they are just, 
the justice Zeus has entrusted to them. 
The order is structured as hierarchically ordered 
social rules. To know what is required of you is to know 
your place within the structure and to do as your role 
requires. Reasoning presuposes action, without which 
reasoning has no function. That a Homeric hero moves 
towards a goal does not mean he is moved by a passion, 
as it has now generally come to mean. Homer's characters 
can justly do as their role requires without an under-
standing of their own decision making in psychological 
terms. 
There could be said to be two main areas of justice. 
. These are- the justice of desert, in which goods of 
excellence are pursued,-that is, competitive standards 
of excellence in sports, the arts, warfare and agriculture, 
and the other justice in which the "goods of effective- 
ness ", (MacIntyre's term), which results in material 
wealth, are pursued. Homer does not differentiate 
between the two, both are part of his goods of excellence. 
Both entail the observation of the rules of society, 
but one may be used as a means of achieving the other, 
or on the other hand, one may subvert the other. Pursuit 
of the goods of effectiveness needs cooperation of others 
in a well ordered society with a rule governed mode of 
life. Disobedience to the rules should carry certain 
penalties of a cost assessed in terms of the goods of 
effectiveness. 
What the rules of justice here, will have to prescribe 
is reciprocity, which will depend on the relative strengths 
or weaknesses of each party within the bargaining situ-
ation. If the rules are to function for any time, at 
least some of the same constraints must apply to the 
powerful as much as to the weak. A rational agent is 
bound to the rules of justice of reciprocity only to 
the extent to which he can commit injustice with impunity. 
Those who administer the rules are just, in that the 
benefits of being so outweigh the disadvantages.Punish -
ment is one of deterrence. 
In a justice of desert, punishment is primarily edu- 
cational. The disobedient idividual is so, because he 
failed to understand his duty. Those who administer the 
rules and enforce justice, will themselves be required 
to be just. If they failed to be just it could only be 
in that they failed to understand how the rules of justice 
function in relation to the goods to which they had given 
their allegiance. At times the two conceptions of justice 
would be unable to function together. 
For justice defined in the goods of excellence, justice 
as a virtue of individuals is definable independently 
and antecedently to the establishment of enforceable 
rules of justice. Justice requires that each person be 
treated in a way compatible with their deserts. In this 
system someone may be unjust, yet obey the rules out 
of fear of punishment. For the justice of the goods of 
effectiveness, one is just who always obeys the rules. 
So the virtue of justice is secondary to and definable 
only in terms of the rules of justice. 
So the first disagreements come over which of the 
justices would define the goals of the Athenian state. 
It is for the sake of the good that those pursuing the 
goods of excellence come together, for the sake of bar-
gaining that those pursuing the goods of effectiveness 
meet. 
Pericles Democracy. Pericles could claim for the 
ordinary Athenian citizen, virtues which the older style 
Greek aristocrats had tried to reserve for themselves. 
Each free citizen was free to pursue a variety of goods 
(there was no conception that the pursuit of some goods 
might be harmful to other goods), and to be just was 
to allow that pursuit. This pursuit automatically brought 
glory to the state. Learning and wisdom were praised, yet 
in dealing with those outside the state, the relationship 
of justice is that of the justice of effectiveness,- 
strong rules the weaker. 
The Periclean conception of the primacy of the state 
is not presented as in any way incompatible with a 
multiplicity of views by individual citizens as to what 
their flourishing may consist in. 
Those who ruled after Pericles pursued their own 
profit rather than that of the city. The defeat of Athens 
in 404 had been accompanied by the overthrow of the 
democracy. Socrates is heard arguing in Republic, that 
it is in the nature of democracy that it prepares the 
way for tyranny. 
Thucydides represents the social world as in which 
there can be only that justice which the strong find 
it in their interest to uphold. Human beings aim at a 
particular kind of power, the power of remaking the social 
and natural world, so far as possible into conformity 
with one l sown desires. 
Plato joins the ideal and the actual- the soul and 
the state. The Platonic world view is postulated as a 
supreme, absolute and therefore non earthly 'value' 
which confers upon all of mans' actions a relative 
'value' set within a hierarchy of values. A central 
thesis of the Republic is that justice in the individual 
psyche' can exist and •be good for the 'psyche', no matter 
how unjustly the individual is treated by the state. 
In this regard justice could be seen as the key element 
in the virtue of individuals and independent of the 
justice of the state. 
Aristotle on the other hand said that a human being, 
separated from his social group is also deprived of his 
capacity for justice. Perhaps Plato was able to make 
, the separation because the philosophical community had 
taken, for him, the place of the state, as a place where 
one can become just. 
The Dialectic that Aristotle contributed to is ess-
entially unfinished at any point in its development, 
which means that all conclusions are also developmental. 
His central idea in which movement from human potent-
iality to its actualization within the state as exemp-
lifying the metaphysical and theological character of 
a perfect universe, became the central idea of mediaeval 
Jewish, Islamic and Christian communities. 
For Aristotle, the best kind of state in which for 
justice to flourish is an "aristocracy" of selective 
citizenry. Certain occupations, women and slaves, while 
discharging functions necessary for the sustaining of 
life of the state, were excluded as unsuitable. Citizens 
were educated in the virtues and since it seems impossible 
to judge consistently correctly concerning a particular 
virtue without possessing the virtue, it seems to follow 
that someone just, must also possess the other virtues. 
1 The good man may aim both at the fine or expedient. 
What is fine or else expedient for the just man will 
be different for the vicious man. 
Justice is a matter of what is fair. What the equality 
of justice consists in, is in like cases being treated 
alike and inproportional differences of merit being 
treated according to that proportion-, which presuposes 
a rank of merit and dismerit, a rank ordering of goods 
to be distributed- and in corrective justice, a rank 
of harms and deprivations. 
Natural justice here consists of laws that any virt-
uous legislator would prohibit, the act of murder, 
adultery, theft. 
When, in the ancient world, justice was extended 
beyond the boundaries of the state, it was always as 
a requirement of theology. 
The Stoics were the first thinkers in the Greco-Roman 
world to assert systematically that the scope of justice 
is humanity and as such, every human was understood to 
be a member of one community under one law. Cicero was 
the thinker who most clearly represented this idea. The 
law was a god given law and all humans share the law 
because all have reason and as a common possession, 
right reason: right reason is law. Human individuals 
are a compound of appetite and reason. Reason commands, 
appetite obeys. Though the idea of community was universal, 
in actual recommendations, Cicero gives a rather limited 
group of people as those to whom one has strong duties. 
The stranger requires no more than well of us. 
Augustine developed, as a christian theologist, a 
scope of justice which was also universal, but it required 
so much more than had the Stoic philosophy, particularly 
in relation to the poor and oppressed. We are to be just 
so as to owe no one anything, but to love one another. 
Justice may exist in that republic which is the City 
of God, where Christ is the incarnation of the perfect 
justice and over which Christ rules. No other community 
. may be just. 
David Hume: 1711-1776. Born in Scotland and brought up 
by his mother within the standards of the Calvinist 
orthodoxy, he became one of the most important Scottish 
thinkers, but peculiarly in relation to the tradition 
of English thought. 
He was to reject religion as holding the central place 
in practical reasoning, and so break with the Scottish 
intellectual and moral tradition. He was also to repud-
iate another strand central to the tradition; its 
affiliation with Roman law and its inheritance from the 
commentators upon Roman law. To Hume the study of law 
was quite separate from that of philosophy. 
Hume recognized two species of moral obligation-, 
"the natural obligation to justice- viz interest", and 
"the moral obligation'.(Treatise 111, ii, 2). He imputed 
the whole population with an ability to recognize why 
they owed obedience to government, (interests of society), 
and when those obligations cease. This reasoning of the 
uneducated would be identical to Hume's own. He proposes 
a general infallibility of moral judgement. 
For Hume the rights of property are absolute. Justice 
in this view serves the ends of property and not vice 
versa. His system of justice is one in which pride in 
possessions and ones place within a hierarchy in which 
property determines rank, mean that the principles of 
justice provide no recognizable grounds for appeals 
against the social order; the right to property is un-
modified by human need. 
Possessions acquired through industry or good fortune 
create social instability. The justification of all 
enforceable rules of property is that they function to 
effect social stability. 
What makes government necessary is that the virtue 
of justice and the closely allied virtue exhibited in 
the keeping of promises-, are not by themselves suffic-
ient to ensure adequate obedience to what Hume calls 
the, "three fundamental laws of nature", (Treatise 111, 
ii, 8): that which prescribes stability in the possession 
of property, that which prescribes its transfer from 
one person or persons to another or others by consent, 
and that which prescribes the keeping of promises. Such 
obedience is endangered because human beings tend to 
prefer present interest over distant interest. 
Government is in the interest of society until such 
time as the tyranny of the governor removes that interest, 
when it also removes the natural inclinations to obedience. 
What makes a government legitimate is "long possession", 
and where there is no form of government established 
by long possession, then present possession is sufficient. 
Hume was opposed to legitimate obedience to govern-
ment upon some original act of consent, that is, prin7 
ciples of justice which hold independently of and 
antecedently to any established status quo distribution 
of property. 
Finally; one judges in all moral and practical matters 
as a member of a community and of a type of social order 
characteristic of all civilized peoples. 
In response to Hume and Aristotle, Thomas Reid,a 
Scottish philosopher, wrote that all plain persons of 
social mind assent to one and the same set of fundamental 
truths as underived first principles, not formed by 
passion or sentiment, embodied in institutionalized 
exchanges or from an education in the virtues only to 
be provided by some particular community. In Reid's 
view there are two independent rational principles,- 
one telling us what duty requires, the other to do with 
what will produce our happiness ; which should, if rightly 
understood, coincide. 
This universal common sense was adapted by Dugald 
Stewart, to an idea that moral practical judgements of 
every culture would have both a universal variant and 
local variable elements. This did not admit Aquinas's 
view that there are absolute prohibitions which a culture 
may infringe without recognizing that it is so doing. 
Liberal Individualism: It is the individual for the 
individual who reasons about good and right. If we have 
come to refer to ourselves as individuals, with the same 
kind of impersonality as we would refer to others, then 
the statement, 'I want' has come to possess the same 
kind of impersonality required of an imperative for 
action. 
In a liberal society there is no one overriding good. 
The rules of justice are both to set constraints upon 
the bargaining process and to protect individuals so 
that they may have freedom to express and, within limits, 
implement their preferences. The stability of property 
is valued only insofar as it contributes to that pro-
tection and does not exclude the disadvantaged from due 
consideration. Desert is, except in some of those sub-
ordinate associations in which groups pursue particular 
chosen goods, irrelevant to justice. 
The recognition of a range of goods is accompanied 
by a recognition of a range of compartmentalized spheres 
in which good is pursued: ie. political, economic, familial 
etc. 
The weight given to an individual preference in the 
market or in political or social realms, relies on what 
the individual has to offer in the bargain." The disad-
vantaged are those without the means to bargain. In this 
society one can reason without reason leading to action. 
Justice is required as some set of regulating principles. 
Any inequality of treatment of individuals requires 
justification. Egalitarianism is seen as freedom to express 
and implement preferences and a share in the means required 
to make implementation effective. The function of the 
justice system, "is to enforce an order in which conflict 
resolution takes place without invoking any overall theory 
of human good" ,12 hence resolution of conflicts are 
referred to the verdicts of the legal system. The range 
of possible alternatives in the individual's, right of 
expression of preferences, are controlled by an elite. 
So, while individuals have equal moral value, in a justice 
system separated from morals, they have equal value in 
respect of their bargaining power: further, if the good 
of the system of pluralist democratic principles, rather 
than the good of its constituent parts, is to be achieved 
it will have to be able to claim an overriding and even 
co-erced allegience. Also, in order to achieve their 
preferences the individuals with the least bargaining 
power will have to exhibit a kind of uniformity which 
severely limits the notion of individuality and transforms 
it into a commodity. 
Rival theories of justice tend to operate when the 
framework in which they were devised to operate through-
out historical periods, are reproduced, which happens 
on a limited basis, in given instances or communities. 
Belief in a mode of justice will be seen as a voluntary 
act of will to further its projects, to empower itself. 
The'se are notes from some of the reading for my work 
practice over the last two and a half years. The aim 
of them here, has been to show how structures of thought, 
whilst they change, do so from the numerous points of 
perspective of past reference. 
The property based accumulative nature of European 
culture, while it has allowed for the enormous expansion 
of knowledge, sits ill at ease with individualism and 
humanism, 'which are themselves products of that nature. 
It seems even if we are doing something virtuous, for 
example, in respect of preservation of the environment, 
the ideas have to be rationalized in terms of future 
human use, otherwise in our society, there can be no 
reason for the acts of preservation. Even within the, 
to us idealistic, goods of excellence, there the com- 
petitive rationale for saving the environment must be 
that it is unique. Areas that are not particularly unique, 
(to us), cannot be justified as useful, within that ration-
ale. 
I have made many references to Hume, because I see 
a lot of his ideas, his horrifying ideas of property 
is the central place of justice, and justice being limited 
to a selfcontained community, continue to be put into 
action, though his theoretical justifications are dis-
credited, eg. human need is supposed to be considered 
in justice. 
Apart from competing theories of justice, there is 
no uniformity of laws in the different states of Australia. 
A magistrate in W.A. fines a young man for theft. He 
has just started a job-, the first since high school. 
He has not the resources to pay the fine so he is im-
prisoned for fine default. He loses his job:In N.S.W. 
and Vic. fine defaulters are no longer sent to gaol. 
In America at the present, opinion polls suggest that 
eighty percent of the population support the death 
penalty in certain instances. How can this be justified 
except as the ancient notion of moral reciprocity? 
Hume's eventual reason for our obedience is self 
love, the old idea that we do right rather than wrong 
because we wish to be done right by. But the best thing 
he said was, we experience an unpleasant taste when we 
contemplate wrong, (common sense); no longer a rational 
reason for abjuring viciousness, it is likely I think 
there is a bad taste when we contemplate wrong. But as 
it stands, enlightened self interest is a contradiction 
in terms. 
Work Practice. 
My earliest series of work was largely concerned with 
juxtaposing emblems of the body,(personal), with emblems 
of history, (political), eg. a teardrop and a random 
date. I also worked on my own poetic texts with collaged 
elements. Both types of pictures were small to medium 
in scale and drawn in pen and ink, or watercolour. 
Although several of these were attractive, and I was 
happy with them, it was generally considered that the 
meaning of the images was unclear, and Idon'tdispute 
it. But the emblem,whetherwords, numbers, or pictures, 
was what interested me most and though I changed the 
type of pictures I made, I retained the emblematic object. 
The Word Pictures: the text for these pictures is my 
own. The idea for them came from looking at David Jones' 
celtic poem and latin word pictures from the late 1940's, 
which I first saw in 1986. I was impressed by the beauty 
and impenetrableness of the writing. My other source 
is my continuing admiration for Irish illuminated man-
uscripts. Both the Celtic poems and the latin manuscripts 
Emblem- tear-drop. 1988 
Watercolour and pencil on paper, 28cmx38cm 
Emblem- electric light. 1988 
Ink and watercolour on paper, 36cmx56cm 
Emblem- Tower of London. 1988 
red ochre, pencil and watercolour on paper, 36cmx56cm 
spoke of things lost, because their original meaning 
was unreadable to me, like relics in a museum that were 
given without explanation. Even explained, the relic 
is explained for and by the contemporary world. T wanted 
to combine this 'lostness' with the 'lost' nature of 
words, their disconnectedness from the temporal world. 
Some of the poems are personal and some have their 
source in newspaper articles about an incident or a crime, 
some are stories. The metaphorical nature of poetry changed 
the meaning of the original event, made it indistinct- 
as the newspaper article itself had done. I was interested 
in the private nature of the events, (theft or murder), 
and their public meaning, and how individual people 
become separated from their own events, except that they 
could only be read through those events, and so the person 
seemed to remain as indecipherable as a ghost. 
The old or antiquated lettering I used for the texts 
made them quite difficult to read, the entire picture 
then, became for me, emblems for the lost nature of history 
and language. Although I made five word pictures into 
lithographs and one into an etching, after the beginning 
of 1989 I didn't make any more word pictures. Most people 
found them impossible to read in any way whatsoever. 
Though it was not my intent, the frustrating aspects 
of the word pictures provoked annoyance from the viewer, 
and I realized I should treat my theme more directly. 
With this in mind, I began the first series of etchings. 
I have based the long thin format of all my etchings 
on Japanese narrative scrolls,- where over the length 
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Privacy of the Murderess. 1988 
Gouache and collage on paper, 56cmx76cm 
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Privacy of the Murderess. 1988 
Six colour lithograph, 56cmx76cm 
of the picture, different times would be represented. 
But instead of a narrative progression, I used the format 
as a panorama of the group. A number of my pictures are 
built up from multiples, mostly of figures. These mul-
tiples represent society, rather than the individual. 
The pictorial sources for my work come from Irish 
illuminated manuscripts, the drawings of Pieter Bruegel, 
Mediaeval illustrations and in an aesthetic sense, various 
romantic British artists. These include the prints and 
watercolours of Samuel Palmer, the Welsh poet/draughts-
man- David Jones, John Craxton,- who produced drawings 
directly descended from Palmer, Paul Nash, and Suther-
land and Moore's prints and drawings from the war years. 
I also looked at the work of S.T. Gill. 
With the exception of the manuscripts and Bruegel, 
I have made an effort to examine examples of these people's 
work in the print rooms and galleries I have visited 
around Australia over the last few years. 
When drawing, I have been keen to emphasise a celtic 
linear quality, partly for its referential value, but 
mostly because I like the linear rather than the tonal. 
Bruegel has been of help via the construction of his 
complicated pictures, and because of the way he melded 
traditional stories and contemporary political events, 
and the way he placed the real and the imaginary, side 
by side. Also for his example of didactic moralism. 
The main reservation I have of my work is that, with 
its mainly British influences and concerns, it could 
amount to little more than another extension of the 
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David Jones. c1949 
Hic Iacet Artvrvs  
pencil on wax crayon. 56.5cmx44.5cm 
Anthony d'Offay Gallery, London 
English cultural influence in Australia. The Anglo-European 
cultural tradition has been the only language I have 
at my disposal but I remain ambivalent about its 
performance. 
Both the word pictures and the etchings are made in the 
mode of allegory. The allegory is the fable of abstractions 
personified. It is regarded as a supplement, the state 
of reading one text through another, or where one text 
is doubled by another; Craig Owens gives the example 
13 of reading the old testament through the new testament. 
This provides not only an additional meaning but a replace-
ment. As a supplement it is aligned to writing in as 
much as writing is conceived as supplementary to speech. 
Allegory is essentially static as opposed to narrative 
which is concerned with unfolding a story. 
Allegory first emerged in response to an estrangement 
from tradition, and throughout its history it has func-
tioned in the gap between a present and a past, which 
without allegorical interpretation might have remained 
foreclosed. This is what Walter Benjamin recognized when 
he preferred the idea of allegory over narrative as a 
way of constructing history, where the present constructs 
the past through itself. 
Allegory has been thought of as an extended metaphor. 
Hannah Arendt distinguishes between metaphor and allegory, 
when she says metaphor, 
establishes a connexion which is sensually perceived in its 
immediacy and requires no interpretation, while an allegory 
always'precedes from an abstract notion and then invents 
something palpable to represent it almost at will. The allegory 
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must be explained before it can be meaningful, a solution must 
be found to the riddle it presents... unhappily reminding one 
of solving puzzles. 14 
Later she says of Benjamin's metaphoric use of lauguage; 
"Linguistic transference enables us to give material 
form to the invisible".15 The difference is the forced 
aspect of allegory over the 'sensually perceived immediacy' 
of metaphor, as if the act of trasference internal to 
allegory was external to metaphor; one rational perhaps 
and the other unconscious. Although there are differences 
in degree and function,- metaphor is personal while alle- 
gory is social, both seem highly rational yet both have 
impulse from the magic of poetry, the irrational. Certainly 
both qualities are to be found in my allegories of social 
justice. 
Tracing the origins of justice in Australia results in a 
jumble of ideas which ultimately link sociological ideas 
with philosophy, Christianity, political history, economics 
and the law. The only constants have been that justice 
is connected to language and that the idea of justice 
as with other ideas, has always tended to be employed 
in maintaining the powerful in positions of power. 
The practice of justice in legal history and up to 
today, has been largely concerned with the protection 
and division of property,- church, state or private. 
I have made most of my pictures, therefore, around the 
aspects of ownership, that is, ownership of ideas, land, 
peoples and finally, the body of the individual: owner-
ship by the powerful and the prevailing ideology. 
A Hundred Stone-breakers. 1989 
etching, 36cmx91cm 
The aim of the notes provided is to show how I have 
traced the history of the origins of justice in Australia, 
through the events that led to their development. In 
other words my interest has been in history. From the 
range of ideas presented, some of which are just history 
but most of which remain in some form as part of our 
received culture, it is possible to see just why our 
modern justice is in a state of confusion. These rec-
eived, often incompatible ideas, now live entwined with 
each other in our personal beliefs and our laws. Yet 
from the depth and breadth of our cultural and insti-
tutional history there is plenty from which to choose 
a course for moderation, consideration and respect in 
our dealings with others and the planet. 
Perhaps the pictures give a rather gloomy idea of 
the manipulation of justice, but Justice has been one 
of the grand ideas that have formed the culture of the 
Western world against which I set my pictures. So while 
I am critical of the functioning of the justice system, 
I also speak in defence of a culture that is both rich 
and diverse. 
There two groups of people that are absent from 
the hundreds of figures that I have drawn in this body 
of work. They are the Aboriginal population, immediately 
silenced by the term terra nullius; and women, by and 
large excluded from history. In their notable absence, 
the two groups are like many reproachful ghosts, at 
once banished and present. 
I do talk about the coerced through the poor, the 
criminal, and the subjugated cultures of the Druids 
and the Celtic, also marginalized by the historical 
process. 
My approach to making pictures falls within a post-
modern way of working; bringing together disparate 
elements in one picture, referring to other pictures, 
using-antiquated letter-forms, texts and old illust-
rations, and based on the various discourses I have 
already mentioned. I have concentrated on the margin-
alized, as Foucault has.- 
The ideas of postmodern critical theory that try 
to break down the boundaries between separate discourses 
have been important in the formulation of my pictures. 
Nonetheless there is an increasing over concern in post-
modernism with the text for its own sake- playful self 
contained writing, when the ideas presented to the majority 
of people through the media go unchallenged, and theory 
loses its chance to be intelligently effective. 
Knowledge of the events of history is important in 
our self conception, as a nation and individually as 
members of human kind. History should not lose its sig-
nificance to our lives. Making a tourist destination 
of Dachau or Port Arthur or the Burma Railway is offen-
sive, not because people should not visit these places 
but because horror is presented as a spectacle for 
commercial consumption. 
The medium in which I work, print, is both tradition-
ally linked to writing through printing, and to political 
commentary. 
I have hoped to place myself somewhere between the 
erudite and the pop, talking about serious but accessible 
ideas, requiring effort to read but not to be incompre-
hensible. 
Prints in Order of Completion.  
1. Battle of the Trees 
2. A Hundred Ghosts 
3. A Hundred Highways 
4. The Far Boundaries of Property 
5. Last Cigarette 
6. Army of Words 
7,8,9. Thief in A Monastery: trilogy.  
10. Privacy of the Murderess 
11. The Young Men 
12. Natural Justice, (young men) 
13. Natural Justice, (old men) 
14. A Hundred Stone Breakers 
15. A Hundred Skeletons 
16. Twelve Executioners 
17. Sheep Stations 
18. Trial Of the Piglet Twins 
19. Oliver Cromwell's Demons 
20. Pioneer Village 




















The Battle of the Trees:  16  the tree alphabet; the letters 
of the ancient Irish alphabet correspond to the tree 
or shrub of which it is the initial. The names of the 
letters in the modern Irish Alphabet are also those of 
trees, and most of them correspond to the old list, 
named by Roderick O'Flaherty, except T has become gorse, 
0- broom, and A- elm. In all Celtic languages, trees 
_mean letters, letters, trees. 
This picture is a cipher of the rediscovery of the 
lost rudiments of poetry in myth and the active principles 
of poetic magic that govern them. 
In the Celtic tradition, the Druids were credited 
with the magical power of transforming trees into warr-
iors and sending them into battle. But the battle in 
the poem, is not a battle physically fought, but a battle 
fought intellectually in the heads and tongues of the 
learned: 
Under the tongue-root 
A fight most dread, 
And another raging 
Behind, in the head. 17 
The original "Battle of the Trees", comes from a myth 
of a battle for religious mastery, through guessing the 
name of the opponent. The name could be used in magic 
against the person or party. The armies were,- An, the 
people who appear in Irish legend as the Tuatha de Danaan, 
"the folk of the god whose mother is Danu",- and the 
armies of Arawn ('Eloquence'), the King of Annwfn, or 
Annwm, which was the British underworld or national 
necropolis. 
In the poem, Gwydion ap Don, guessed the name of the 
man Bran, meaning crow which also meant alder, sprigs 
of which, he held in his hand. Gwydion's party belonged 
to the Ash-god. Thus the Battle of the Trees ended in 
a victory of the Ash-god and his ally, over the Alder-
god and his ally. 
The poem "The Battle of the Trees", is a pied poem. 
To disguise information which would give adversaries 
power, the Druids made poems into which would be jumbled 
four or five other poems, making a kind of rough but 
misleading sense. In this poem, names and places were 
disguised in their equivalent as trees. A pied poem 
might contain quite a large number of riddles, each with 
a separate solution which could only be attempted after 
the separation of the original poem, from the others. 
On top of this there were cipher alphabets. A fully 
trained poet had to learn a hundred and fifty cipher 
alphabets, which could be made from Colours, Birds, 
Trees, Fortresses, Numbers, ect. In their use, there 
could be tricks of order, reversal of words or translation 
into a foreign language. 
So my "Battle of the Trees", is a picture about a 
language that was composed of letters that had a real 
connection with the natural world, a language not like 
nature, but as nature. It is a poetic, magical connection 
that is no longer open to us. In historical terms it 
was lost with the Roman invasion of England in the first 
century, when the Druids and their sacred groves were 
fairly systematically destroyed. The letters C T, in 
modern Roman letters, are the Roman numeral for a hundred 
and T for trees. One T is upside down: and my pictures 
of trees are nothing more than twigs. The magic groves 
were cut down/ the armies laid to waste, and the culture 
lost. 
This early etching is a kind of key to my intent to 
examine political history, and through the poetic, to 
grasp some emotion from the past, from my position in 
this society of the present. 
A Hundred Ghosts: refers to working men without work, 
how unemployment turns the worker into a shadow, putting 
him outside the system of production, as it does the 
criminal. 
A Hundred Highways: is about property through division; 
it also embodies disparate discourses in roads that lead 
on forever and never meet. 
The Far Boundaries of Property: concerns the transposition 
of vaious cultural aspects onto the Australian countryside, 
from Europe. The silos and the goldmining apparatus 
refer to how the worth of the land is conceived in econ-
omic terms. 
Last Cigarette: a hundred heads hover in an empty space, 
on little clouds. This is a picture of execution through 
history. It has a small drawing of Walter Ralegh, who 
introduced tobacco into England, and who was executed 
for treason in 1618. Ralegh also sailed on the first 
two of England's colonizing expeditions, though he did 
not command the first. Both to North America, a year 
after the first, Ralegh returned the survivers to England 
at their own request. The next expedition of a hundred and 
fifty colonists disappeared. They either died, were 
killed by the local Indians, or had joined the Indians, 
it is still not sure. 18 
Army of Words: a poem describing words as an army of 
ghosts. A man receives a long awaited letter, but the 
wind blows it away before he can read it. 
A Hundred Stone Breakers: the title comes from Courbet's 
great humanist allegory of two stone breakers working 
on a road. This painting was destroyed in 1945 in the 
Dresden fire bombing. My picture is about 'docile bodies'. 
A Hundred Skeletons: 'Death is now an intrinsic part 
of the fragile and empty existence of things, whereas 
in the Middle Ages death came from the outside' 1 9 This 
picture takes something from both the 'Dance of Death', 
and the memento mori tradition. In the dance of death, 
death was always depicted,(either with flesh hanging 
off their bodies in tatters, or after the sixteenth 
century increase in anatomical knowledge, as skeletons), 
as dancing off with unwilling living. The living through 
their clothing and accoutrements, were shown to be from 
all classes and rank of profession. Hence it was a late 
development to include women as they had no profession. 
They were represented as a condition,ie. newly married, 
pregnant and so on. The skeletons were never depicted 
eating and the tradition in no way represented the psy-
chological concerns to be found in later Romantic macabre 
artworks. Memento mori, remembrance of death- is an 
object imbued with a sense of passing time, either as 
a depiction of death, a death's head on a ring,- or 
something old and obviously worn. Like the dance of death, 
memento mori were originally intended to inspire fear 
and pious living, in order to gain salvation, but mingled 
with the message that the immanence of death enriches 
life. After the sixteenth century memento mori came to 
be understood in the sense of vanity. This idea took 
away some of the pleasure in accumulating goods. Death 
was no longer terrible, but at the same time it was less 
possible to enjoy life. By the nineteenth century the 
individual was nothing, (in the face of the universe, 
conversely as he was becoming more singular in the world), 
and the idea of the void had deeply entered popular 
consciousness. 
Drawing on these two traditions, this picture is about 
folly: the folly of empty refusal to change ideas and 
behaviour, even though all use for them has gone, and 
that the folly of the group disguises the folly. 
Twelve Executioners: concerns public execution and houses 
of confinement. The prince (his delegate), seizes upon 
the body of the condemned and bears it to the ground, 
then displays it. In his crime the criminal has touched 
the very person of the prince. 
The public execution did not re-establish justice, 
it re-activated power. The executioner was not only the 
implement of the law, he also deployed the force; he 
was the agent of the violence applied, in order to master 
it, to the violence of the crime. On the person of the 
criminal the horror of the transgression had to be 
manifested and annulled. 
Public tortures and executions are the effect of a 
system of production in which labour power, and therefore 
the human body, has neither the utility nor commercial 
value that are conferred on them in an economy of an 
industrial type. Also, the ready presence of death gave 
rise to rituals intended to integrate it, to make it 
acceptable and to give meaning to death's permanent 
aggression. Public execution revealed truth and showed 
the operation of power. The truth power relationship 
remains at the heart of all mechanisms of power. 
While atrocious punishment was public, humane punish-
ment was private. The point of application is no longer 
the body, it is the mind or rather a play of represent-
ations and signs circulating discretely but necessarily 
and evidently in the minds of all. Here two things become 
evident: the criminal becomes placed outside society, 
and a system of measurement of the effects of the 
treatment' on the criminal, is necessary. 
Originally detention was bound up with despotism, 
but by 1596 in Amsterdam, the first prison/reformatory 
opened. 20 
Army of Ragged Men: is about the poor. The Elizabethan 
Poor Law Code of 1601 which remained law for over two 
centuries, caused the state to take over from the charity 
provided by the Church, as a national duty, the task 
of providing for those living in destitution. The 'poor 
in very deed', were morally distinguished from roving 
beggars who were branded and forced to return to their 
native parishes, otherwise to go to a House of Correction. 
The poor were contained and made accountable; being un-
attached to property was made an offence under law and 
by implication, a moral offence. 21  
Sheep Stations: refers both to the land use and to the 
colloquial expression, which means playing for massive 
stakes. The land is absolutely empty apart from a few 
imported monuments, to immigration, to industry, and 
to chivalrous codes of manners. Standing on the monument 
to immigration, an Aboriginal woman has been taken out 
of the landscape and re-presented as something between 
a 1950's kitsch object d'art, a biological specimen, 
and the eighteenth century idea of the noble savage. 
A crown, the European representation of hereditary 
right to rule, hangs over the landscape. 
Pioneer Village: is about 'Australia the Penitentiary,. 
Henry 11 is seated before the Tower of London while from 
the waves wash objects that signify the invention of 
Australia, soon to be re-invented in Pioneer Villages 
across the nation..Paul Carter describes an imperialism 
of 'naming', how the explorers who travelled and wrote 
and named as they did so, emphasized the distance of 
the observer from what he saw; "places are means not 
of settling, but of travelling on... of multiple futures, 
endless journey, arrivals and departures". 22 
Oliver Cromwell's Demons: Oliver Cromwell gained power 
and governed with the aid of the army, and at no time 
was it possible for him to govern without the army. It 
was Cromwell who developed the modern standing army in 
England. Hitherto the army had been composed of the sons 
of nobles, squire's sons and conscripted farmers, who 
were unwilling to fight outside their own county, outside 
their own concerns. Cromwell's army was composed mainly 
of the middle class and tradespeople, with various relig-
ious groups- held together through drilling and religious 
discipline. They were forbidden from looting or ransom, 
the accepted manner in which armies took most of their 
pay, and were paid by Parliament. It was this breakdown 
of the personal concerns of the soldiers and the substi-
tuion of the abstract notion of fighting for an idea-
the idea of the nation, that was modern; and a precursor 
to an army of the future that could logically comprise 
every able-bodied man from a nation. 
In January 1649 Charles 1 was beheaded. Cromwell felt 
he had no choice and he always took strong political 
compulsion to be the voice of God. 
Cromwell's conquest of Ireland- 1649-50, was the most 
complete of all English conquests of Ireland. He left 
a third of the Irish population dead through war or 
starvation, and two thirds of the Irish land forcibly 
changed from Catholic to Protestant hands. 
During his Protectorship, Cromwell is credited with 
beginning the British Civil Service when he abolished 
the fees of the Clerks of the Privy Seal and put them 
on a salary. His Secretary of State also created the 
first secret service in England, useful to Cromwell for 
the detection of unrest. These then are the political 
demons of Cromwell's Commonwealth. 
This picture is about the ambivalence of great single 
figures of history, of great Heads of State, more 
especially Oliver Cromwell, who though he governed for 
the people, could never keep his parliments from under-
mining him and could never rule without forceP Oliver 
Cromwell's political demons are as much our psychological 
demons. 
Thief in a Monastery: a trilogy of sonnets, loosely 
based on the theft and later return of a number of not 
very valuable icons from a Benedictine monastery in 
New Norcia, Western Australia. The pictures are like 
pages from an illuminated manuscript. They represent 
three different times of day, late evening, sunset, 
and mid-day. 
Privacy of the Murderess: the text is a sonnet about 
a murderess, the idea for which came from newspaper 
articles on the 1987 rape/murders of several young girls 
in Western Australia, committed by David Birnie and 
his common law wife, Catherine. Catherine murdered to 
prove her loyalty to David. The poem does not specifically 
refer to the case. 
Contrasted with the poem is a drawing taken from 
a contemporary engraving of Queen Elizabeth 1. So the 
poem refers to private murder,(through the intimate 
tone of the poem), and public/state murder. 
The Young Men: a sonnet about the close proximity of 
the labouring class and unemployed men, to the prison 
system. It has a picture of the Tower of London, an 
incarceration house for political prisoners. I think 
all prisoners are political prisoners. 
Natural Justice: (the young men), inspired by Jean Genet's, 
The Miracle of the Rose, is about an aesthetic of crime. 
The Greek idea of Natural Justice, natural prohibitions 
for man, is contrasted with a modern, indifferent 'nature'. 
Natural Justice: (the old men), while the meaning of 
the picture is ironical, I hoped my old men to show a 
kind of stubborn resistance. Though the picture shows 
decay, it is also about the resistance an idea can have, 
to decay. If irony is first about despair, then it must 
be secondly about hope. 
Trial of the Piglet Twins: is taken from an old illus-
tration of an English court in progress, and changed 
to look like a fairy tale illustration. It is about a 
paternalistic court system that treats the accused as 
something between a child and a 'monster. 
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